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‘A Joint Controlling System’: Commonwealth Bases and the Special Relationship, 1945-
1947 
 
Britain’s position in 1945 was precarious but London was not prepared to relinquish global 
power status. Most famously, Winston Churchill in March 1946 argued this goal could be 
achieved by nurturing an Anglo-American ‘special relationship’. Yet Britain also sought to 
utilise the British Commonwealth of Nations to prop-up its position and facilitate closer 
bonds with the United States. Significantly, Churchill had also claimed that the joint use of 
military bases could provide the mechanism to bind this ‘English-speaking’ alliance. This 
vision was, crucially, shared by the Labour foreign secretary, Ernest Bevin, who described 
the US-Commonwealth military partnership as ‘a joint controlling system’. Nevertheless, 
between 1945 and 1947 the Truman administration’s attempts to gain base rights in the 
Southwest Pacific, India and on Ascension Island proved one of the most controversial issues 
between Washington and the Commonwealth capitals during the immediate post-war period. 
This article demonstrates that the Commonwealth members remained unwilling to sacrifice 
their partnership in favour of closer ties with the United States. At the same time, Washington 
sought to negotiate separate agreements with each of its wartime allies and refused to enter 
into binding reciprocal regional defence arrangements with the Commonwealth.  
 











Despite being a victorious power Britain’s international position at the end of the Second 
World War was more precarious than it had been since the Napoleonic Wars. The nation was 
bankrupt; London’s grip on its Empire had been severely weakened; and it had been eclipsed 
by the United States and the Soviet Union. Yet policy-makers in the incoming Labour 
government assumed Britain would remain a global power. Most prominent in their thoughts 
was the nurturing of the bonds forged with Washington during the war. As such, enormous 
historical attention has been lavished on what the former prime minister of Britain, Winston 
Churchill, famously labelled in his 5 March 1946 speech in Fulton, Missouri, the ‘special 
relationship’. Yet the British Commonwealth of Nations was seen as the other central prop to 
Britain’s attempts to resurrect its post-war international standing. Moreover, the 
Commonwealth was a vital feature of Britain’s relationship with the United States.  
In fact, Churchill himself had described the ‘special relationship’ as not exclusively 
Anglo-American but one between ‘the British Commonwealth and Empire and the United 
States’ and as a ‘fraternal association of the English-speaking peoples’. He also explained the 
mechanism underlying this alliance. While laying great emphasis on political, economic and 
cultural bonds, Churchill spelled out his key proposal to combat the growing Soviet threat: 
‘The continuance of the intimate relationship between our military advisers…It should carry 
with it the continuance of the present facilities for mutual security by the joint use of all 
Naval and Air Force bases in the possession of either country all over the world…Already we 
use together a large number of islands; more may well be entrusted to our joint care in the 
near future.’ To achieve this goal, Churchill argued that the US-Canadian Permanent Joint 
Board of Defence ‘should be extended to all British Commonwealths with full reciprocity’. 




therefore, Churchill claimed ‘there will be no quivering, precarious balance of power to offer 
its temptation to ambition or adventure’.1 
Crucially, this vision was soon shared by the Labour foreign secretary, Ernest Bevin, 
who D. K. Fieldhouse describes as ‘at least as Churchillian as Churchill’.2 Indeed, just ten 
months after Churchill pronounced the ‘special relationship’ Bevin privately described the 
United States and the Commonwealth as ‘a joint controlling system’. Indeed, Bevin argued 
that any decline in the military position and prestige of the Commonwealth, particularly in 
the Pacific, would damage ‘our common cause’ with Washington.3 In many ways, therefore, 
this label was more appropriate than the emotive language used by Churchill since it focused 
on the close military ties that formed the bedrock of the relationship. Nevertheless, while 
between 1945 and 1947 the administration of the president of the United States, Harry 
Truman, sought exclusive or joint rights to numerous bases in British colonial and 
Commonwealth-controlled territories, its efforts proved a major point of controversy between 
Washington and the Commonwealth capitals. It should also be noted that these negotiations 
were separate from the well-known deliberations concerning the United States’ growing 
desire for base facilities in the British Isles. As such, this issue is excluded from this article. 
Still, the Commonwealth bases issue has been largely overlooked by ‘special 
relationship’ historians. John Baylis, John Charmley, Alan Dobson, John Dumbrell, Ritchie 
Ovendale, Bradford Perkins, Robin Renwick, and David Reynolds all agree that during the 
first eighteen months after the war, before the Cold War had become a reality, Anglo-
American relations were characterised by tension. But these historians do not mention the 
bases issue, instead focussing on clashes over the US loan of $3.75 billion to bankrupt 
Britain, nuclear cooperation, the Palestine Mandate, divided Germany, and the British 
withdrawal from Greece.4 Moreover, while Alex Danchev and Steve Marsh and John Baylis 




negotiations undertaken.5 Randall Bennett Woods goes one step further, briefly discussing 
the US War and State departments’ ‘strongest bid’ for the transfer of these bases. But Woods’ 
focus is how this issue impacted the US loan to Britain.6 Moreover, Alan Bullock’s 
magisterial biography of Bevin dedicates just three pages to his wrangling on the bases issue 
with the US secretary of state, James Byrnes.7 Likewise, Byrnes’ memoirs are silent on these 
discussions.8 
Additionally, Commonwealth historians have said little about the bases issue. H. 
Duncan Hall, Ivor Jennings, and Francine McKenzie focus on the constitutional and 
economic challenges faced by the Commonwealth after the Second World War.9 Nicholas 
Mansergh, W. David McIntyre, Krishna Srinivasan, and Patrick Gordon Walker do pay 
greater attention to Commonwealth regional defence planning but only briefly note base 
negotiations with the United States.10 Similarly, the leading historian of British 
decolonization, John Darwin, mentions Commonwealth defence but says nothing specific 
about the bases.11  
In contrast, Richard Best outlines the extensive planning undertaken by the US 
military during and after the Second World War regarding the acquisition of air and naval 
base rights to construct a global defensive chain. Yet Best is much more interested in bases in 
the North Atlantic, where the Soviet threat was more imminent, than in the Southwest 
Pacific, South Atlantic and India where the Commonwealth was more directly concerned.12 
Consequently, Best fails to fully address the strains created between Washington and the 
Commonwealth capitals over the bases. P. G. A. Orders is more effective in this respect since 
he argues that the Truman administration sought to pressure Britain, Australia and New 
Zealand to gain base rights in the Southwest Pacific but these three countries successfully 




military force. But Orders goes into little depth regarding the negotiations and is only 
interested in this one region.13 
Using American, British, Australian and New Zealand sources, therefore, this article 
demonstrates for the first time that in the initial post-war period the Commonwealth members 
were still largely unwilling to bow to American pressure, and strengthen their individual ties 
to Washington, if this meant sacrificing the close Commonwealth military connection. It will 
also show that the Truman administration refused to make any concessions to allay the fears 
of its wartime military partners, especially if this involved entering into an ‘entangling 
alliance’ with the Commonwealth. Instead, the prevailing view in Washington was that 
arrangements should be concluded with each Commonwealth country on an individual basis. 
In doing so, the majority of this article will focus on the talks regarding Commonwealth bases 
in the Southwest Pacific since these were the most fraught and dominated proceedings. 
However, the American military had global designs and Byrnes raised in conjunction with 
this issue the US desire for joint use of British airfields on Ascension Island in the South 
Atlantic and in India. As such, these difficult talks must also be examined. Lastly, the 
reciprocal use of US and Commonwealth naval ports, the only tangible agreement to come 
out of the negotiations, will be analysed.  
 
2. Southwest Pacific Islands 
 
Following the turnaround in fortunes in the war in 1943 the US military began considering its 
post-war global base requirements to prevent the country being exposed to aggression in the 
future. Yet the State Department did not want to discuss this matter with Britain until after 
the Axis Powers had been defeated.14 Consequently, the issue was first raised by Byrnes with 




Byrnes revealed that the US joint chiefs of staff wanted long-term rights at military facilities 
that the United States had utilised or constructed at considerable expense during the war, 
including bases on Iceland and the Portuguese Azores and Cape Verde Islands. But the vast 
majority of the desired bases were located in territories governed by Commonwealth 
members in the Southwest Pacific. Washington wanted these countries to cover the costs of 
maintaining the bases in peacetime but their control be transferred to the US military in 
wartime. Moreover, Byrnes hinted that such a ‘gesture’ might convince Truman to reverse his 
recent decision to terminate Lend-Lease aid to cash-strapped Britain.15  
The British initial response, however, was mixed. Clearly the Labour government, 
despite its anti-colonial credentials and desire to focus on welfare reform, continued to hold 
strategic and economic interests in the Southwest Pacific. Indeed, the first sea lord, Admiral 
Sir Andrew Cunningham, argued on 11 January 1946 that Britain must ‘show the flag’ to 
maintain its prestige and prevent American domination of the region.16 Bevin, though, 
initially refused to discuss the matter ‘until we could see the whole picture of what America 
really wanted’ and doubted that any action could now dissuade Truman from terminating 
Lend-Lease. Evidently, as Bullock claims, Bevin distrusted Byrnes and believed that the 
proposal was part of a concerted effort to take advantage of Britain’s weakened position.17 
On the other hand, the British ambassador at Washington, Lord Halifax, was much more 
eager to meet US wishes, arguing that an agreement on bases would ‘have [a] very useful 
effect on public opinion and Congress’ regarding the many issues – especially the loan 
agreement – being negotiated between the two countries.18  
As a result, Bevin adopted a step-by-step approach, requesting on 12 October 1945 a 
list of all the Commonwealth territories in which the United States desired base rights.19 On 6 
November 1945 Byrnes obliged producing an aide-memoire containing two lists relating to 




including the condominium of Canton and Enderbury jointly governed with the United States 
– and nine islands governed by New Zealand whose sovereignty had been disputed by 
Washington for many years. The aide-memoire claimed the time was right for these islands to 
be recognised as American possessions, especially Canton, Funafuti and Christmas Island on 
which the US military had constructed facilities during the war. The second list consisted of 
ten islands – eight British-governed, including Tarawa, as well as Manus in the Australian 
League of Nations’ mandate of New Guinea and Upolu in the New Zealand mandate of 
Western Samoa – on which US bases had been constructed. The aide-memoire stated that the 
United States desired exclusive or joint control of these bases on the cryptic basis that ‘the 
strategic importance of these islands to the United States defences in the Pacific…requires no 
comment’.20 In fact, the United States had spent over $230 million constructing these bases 
and this evidently underlay the Services’ determination to retain the right to use them.21 What 
is more, on 7 November 1945 the joint chiefs of staff concluded that exclusive rights at 
Canton and joint rights at Manus were ‘essential’ while exclusive rights at Funafuti and joint 
rights at Tarawa were ‘desirable’.22 
Significantly, Bevin discussed Byrnes’ aide-memoire first not with his Labour 
colleagues but with Churchill. On 13 November 1945 the leader of the opposition responded 
in words prophetic of his Fulton speech, writing: ‘The future of the world depends upon the 
fraternal association of Great Britain and the Commonwealth with the United States…[since] 
the British Commonwealth and the United States were for strategic reasons one organism.’ 
Churchill added: ‘The long-term advantage to Britain and the Commonwealth is to have our 
affairs so interwoven with those of the United States in external and strategic matters.’ 
Churchill thus argued that joint association of the Commonwealth and the United States in 
the Southwest Pacific bases would make the former indispensable to the latter.23 A week later 




would be of value in ‘helping to tie the United States to us more firmly in defence 
matters…all around the globe’. Yet the military chiefs were more cautious than Churchill. 
They opposed any US-Commonwealth defence agreement in advance of the United Nations 
(UN) Security Council establishing its own security arrangements, fearing this would 
undermine the new world organisation and antagonise Moscow. The chiefs of staff also 
strongly opposed transferring sovereignty of the disputed islands until US intentions for them 
were clearer. In addition, they wanted reciprocal rights at US bases in the Central Pacific.24  
Bevin was thus caught in a quandary. He shared Churchill’s vision of using bases ‘to 
tie up the United States to the maximum extent in the defence of the British Commonwealth’. 
But Bevin also shared the military’s concerns and feared that ‘bad blood’ would be created 
between Britain and its Commonwealth allies if they were not immediately brought into 
‘fullest consultation’.25 On 22 November 1945, therefore, the British secretary of state for 
commonwealth relations, Lord Addison, informed the Australian and New Zealand 
governments of Byrnes’ proposals, and called for a joint approach.26 This desire to work in 
harmony with the Pacific Dominions also fitted with Britain’s evolving post-war strategy for 
Commonwealth defence – based on Britain’s own limited resources – with each member 
assuming responsibility for its ‘zone’ with Australia and, to a lesser extent, New Zealand 
acting as the Commonwealth’s representatives in the Southwest Pacific.27  
This strategy also chimed with Australia’s own aspirations to take a leading role in the 
region. Even before the end of the Second World War, the Australian Labour government, 
especially the minister for external affairs, Dr H. V. Evatt, had given considerable thought to 
the post-war defence of the Southwest Pacific.28 In fact, on 21 January 1944, concerned with 
growing American domination of the region and annoyed at being excluded from the 1943 
Cairo Conference, Australia and New Zealand had signed the Canberra Pact. This agreement 




insisting that military bases constructed in the territory of another power could not be used 
for territorial claims. While Evatt had been the driving force behind the Canberra Pact, the 
Labour prime minister of New Zealand, Peter Fraser, wholeheartedly supported the 
agreement but was careful to insist that there was nothing in it calculated to dissever the close 
wartime relationship with the United States and insisted Pacific security depended upon 
mutual cooperation with Washington.29 
Then on 19 June 1945 the Australian Defence Committee concluded that British 
forces could no longer protect imperial possessions in the Pacific and Australia needed to 
take greater responsibility for its own local defences. Moreover, Australia required 
‘adequately protected bases in and to the north of Australia’ to deter interruption of sea 
communications, sporadic raids, and invasion.30 Clearly Australia and New Zealand remained 
haunted by events during 1942-3 when they had been left unprotected by Britain and relied 
on US forces to repel the Japanese offensive. At war’s end, fearing a revanchist Japan, the 
Pacific Dominions, therefore, wanted to retain a US protective umbrella in the Southwest 
Pacific but on the condition that the Commonwealth character of the region was not 
diminished. In addition, the two countries believed that the islands claimed by the United 
States were crucial to their defence and could not be transferred in case Washington remained 
neutral in a future war as it had for much of the previous war.31 The prime minister of 
Australia, Ben Chifley, in particular, believed that Washington wanted exclusive control of 
the facilities on Australian-controlled Manus since this had cost approximately $132 million 
and was the largest US naval repair base west of Pearl Harbor.32 
Nonetheless, on 10 December 1945 Byrnes welcomed bringing Australia and New 
Zealand into the base negotiations expecting them to support continued US military 
involvement in the Southwest Pacific. He also attempted to dispel Commonwealth concerns 




military plans for them.33 Australia and New Zealand, however, were far from the compliant 
vassals Byrnes expected. Fraser swiftly told Chifley that the islands under Commonwealth 
sovereignty ‘should not be given up lightly’ and no arrangements could be entered into before 
the establishment of the UN’s security system. In response, Chifley stated he was in favour of 
‘strong joint British Commonwealth-United States bases in the Pacific’ but only as part of ‘an 
overall plan’ for regional security.34 Evatt, however, was most critical of Byrnes’ proposals. 
The Australian had previously incurred Washington’s ire over the 1944 Canberra Pact and by 
opposing the veto power of UN permanent members at the 1945 San Francisco Conference.35 
US antipathy towards Evatt, though, reached new heights over the bases issue. Evatt claimed 
on 12 January 1946 that the ‘present [US] move is a try on’, insisting that no Commonwealth 
territory be surrendered and use of military facilities in the Pacific must be reciprocal.36 
Consequently, Bevin wanted to reassure Byrnes that the Commonwealth was taking 
the US proposals seriously and invited the secretary of state to meet with the Commonwealth 
leaders gathered in London before the first UN General Assembly.37 Byrnes agreed to a 
meeting on 22 January 1946 and clearly expected to convince the Commonwealth countries 
to accept his proposals since he emphasised that the United States had paid for the 
construction of the bases and implied that they might be needed against a revanchist Japan. 
Byrnes also stressed that it was in Britain’s interest to settle the disputed islands issue while 
the loan deal was being passed in Congress since ‘a settlement would have good effect upon 
his public and at the same time upon his admirals’. Byrnes was thus taken aback when the 
usually moderate Fraser responded that there was ‘nothing doing’ over the disputed islands. 
Fraser also offered to reimburse the United States for the base on Upolu to bring it under 
Commonwealth control. Not wanting the meeting to end on this sour note, however, Bevin 
proposed that a joint commission, composed of military and civilian officials from the four 




islands in the Southwest Pacific. While Byrnes was clearly annoyed no solution had been 
found, he grudgingly agreed to hold exploratory talks in Washington.38  
The Australian government, however, adopted a harder line immediately after this 
meeting. To begin with, on 24 January 1946 Evatt informed the US Embassy in no uncertain 
terms that the Southwest Pacific bases should only be made available to the United States on 
the principle of reciprocity.39 In addition, four days later Chifley informed Addison that he 
wanted the joint commission’s terms to be broadened so that the future defence arrangements 
for the entire Pacific could be discussed. Alternatively, Chifley proposed holding a 
conference of all interested countries to discuss this issue in Australia given its proximity to 
the area of interest. Evatt believed that these proposals were necessary since ‘there is a 
tendency on the part of United States to isolate such questions from one another when really 
they are part and parcel of the same broad question as to the future Pacific set up’.40 
Consequently, Canberra submitted a note to the US State Department insisting that Australia 
and New Zealand be represented at all stages of discussions regarding military base rights in 
the Pacific.41 
With US-Commonwealth tensions mounting the prime minister of Britain, Clement 
Attlee, suggested on 4 February 1946 holding a Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ Meeting to 
principally discuss Pacific defence. Chifley promptly welcomed this proposal hoping to unite 
the Commonwealth behind Australia’s position.42 Fraser and Addison, however, argued that 
they had committed to holding preliminary talks in Washington and it would create 
‘misunderstanding’ if they withdrew now. Moreover, they believed that these exploratory 
discussions could only help reveal what the United States truly had in mind. Addison, 
therefore, assured the Australian High Commission in London that the British government 
simply sought to use the talks in Washington to persuade the Americans that ‘we are not 




Still, the Australian position solidified. To start with, Chifley produced a directive on 14 
February 1946 stating that the future of the US bases constructed on Commonwealth territory 
should be considered simultaneously with Pacific defence under Article 52 of the UN Charter 
that permitted the establishment of regional security arrangements. This directive also 
insisted that any plan for Pacific bases include the principle of reciprocity.44 Evatt then went 
even further stating that the United States’ ‘stale and not genuine’ claims regarding the 
sovereignty of the Pacific islands ‘should be made openly before the permanent court [of 
international justice] and resisted’.45 Yet Bevin argued that Britain and New Zealand at least 
must honour their commitment to hold talks in Washington and make it clear that the 
Commonwealth wanted ‘to associate the Americans as closely as possible with us in common 
defence problems in the Pacific as elsewhere’.46 
Like the Commonwealth, the Truman administration was also becoming divided on 
the Pacific bases. At a cross-departmental meeting on 9 February 1946 the US Army argued 
that Manus and Upolu were of their ‘lowest requirement’. The State Department also urged 
the United States to pursue control of these bases only if they were absolutely necessary 
given these islands were part of mandates that would soon be transferred to the UN 
Trusteeship Council. The US Navy and Air Force, nevertheless, were desperate to maintain 
their Manus and Upolu bases so that in wartime these could be activated to protect the United 
States’ southern flank. These two Services thus wanted the two islands declared ‘strategic 
areas’ under Article 82 of the UN Charter and for the United States to be made either the sole 
or a joint trustee when they became UN Trusteeships.47 Byrnes was clearly annoyed by this 
attitude and informed Halifax that the Services were ‘opening their mouths wider in this 
question of bases than Congress would be for long ready to pay for’ and were ‘in danger of 




Even so, Byrnes sought now to drive a wedge between the Commonwealth countries 
by dealing with them individually. He focused his attentions first on New Zealand. He met 
with Fraser in Washington on 26 February 1946 and stated that the United States preferred 
bilateral agreements rather than dealing with the Commonwealth as a whole. More 
specifically, the Truman administration did not want exclusive control of the Upolu base but 
only the right to ‘avail themselves of these facilities whenever the necessity arose’. Byrnes 
thus produced a draft agreement proposing that when Western Samoa was transferred to the 
UN Trusteeship Council Upolu be designated a ‘strategic area’ allowing the United States 
continued use of the military bases on the island.49 In response, Fraser promised full 
consideration of this proposal but made it plain that he would have to discuss it with Australia 
and Britain. He also questioned concluding any agreement that might derogate from the 
prestige of the UN Trusteeship Council. Still, Byrnes believed that his proposal had been 
well-received and claimed Fraser and he ‘were now about 99.9% in agreement’.50 While 
clearly an exaggeration, Fraser was now reluctant to participate in the Washington talks. Yet 
Bevin understood what Byrnes was seeking to achieve and was concerned that ‘if New 
Zealand were now also to run out, we should indeed by exposing ourselves to allowing each 
member of the Commonwealth to be taken in detail by the Americans with clear disadvantage 
to each of us, instead of presenting as united a front as possible’. On this basis Wellington 
reluctantly agreed to participate in the talks.51 
As a result, on 13 March 1946 the first Anglo-American-New Zealand meeting took 
place.52 Some initial progress was made with the US delegation accepting that if it was 
granted long-term joint rights to the Manus and Upolu bases Australia and New Zealand 
could still extend similar rights to other Commonwealth countries. It was also agreed that 
Australia and New Zealand should cover the costs of maintaining these bases in peacetime. 




exclusive control of the bases on the disputed Canton, Funafuti and Christmas islands. 
Moreover, to the British delegation’s annoyance, the US delegation again linked the bases 
issue to the loan negotiations.53 Still, Halifax reported his view that the United States only 
really desired exclusive rights to the bases on the disputed islands and would renounce its 
other claims. But Bevin was annoyed by Halifax’s interference and instructed the British 
ambassador to focus on finding out as much as possible about Byrnes’ specific proposals so 
these could be explored at the forthcoming Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ Meeting.54 
At the second meeting in Washington on 19 March 1946, nevertheless, the 
atmosphere deteriorated with the British delegation calling for reciprocal Commonwealth 
rights at US bases in the Central and North Pacific. The US delegation quickly sought to 
quash this ‘embarrassing’ question by stating that Washington was asking for rights to bases 
it had constructed on Commonwealth territory while the Commonwealth countries had paid 
nothing for facilities on American territory. The US delegation also warned the British not to 
raise this matter so soon after Churchill’s Fulton speech that had proven so controversial in 
the United States. Still, the Americans did reassure the Commonwealth delegations that use 
of US bases would never be denied in wartime.55 Consequently, after two further meetings at 
which no progress was made, Bevin decided on 3 April 1946 that an agreement was a distant 
possibility and believed the time was now ripe to discuss the Australian proposal for a Pacific 
defence arrangement with the Commonwealth leaders.56 He was evidently influenced by a 
chiefs of staff report presented to the Cabinet the previous day outlining the 
Commonwealth’s strategic position. This report placed great emphasis on the importance of 
the Southwest Pacific as one of Britain’s ‘main support areas’ in a future – potentially atomic 
– war and prompted the Attlee government to find a means to defend the area without having 
to commit more resources.57 Yet, as Halifax concluded, the exploratory talks only confirmed 




US-Commonwealth association in the defence of the Southwest Pacific. In contrast, the 
Truman administration only wanted to secure rights to the US-constructed bases in the 
Southwest Pacific and attain the disputed islands.58  
Before the Commonwealth leaders met in London, however, Byrnes tried again to 
divide them. To begin with, on 14 March 1946, just a day after the Washington talks had 
commenced, the State Department handed a memorandum to the Australian Legation stating 
that the United States desired joint rights at the Manus base and for the island to be 
designated a ‘strategic area’ when Australia transferred its New Guinea mandate to the UN 
Trusteeship Council.59 Evatt, however, was in no mood to compromise. The previous day he 
had told the House of Representatives that his government would not agree to any 
arrangements for the re-allocation of territory or the disposition of military bases in the 
Pacific or to the lessening of Australian control over its territories. Evatt insisted that any 
plans for the joint use of bases in Australia’s dependent territories must ‘be preceded by an 
over-all defence arrangement for the region of the Western Pacific…[and] Australia should 
be entitled to reciprocal use of foreign bases in the region’.60 Evatt, therefore, informed 
Byrnes that he desired a regional arrangement and was opposed to ‘piecemeal proposals’ on 
individual bases. He thus informed the US Embassy that he could not discuss anything 
concrete until after the Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ Meeting.61 Byrnes did, though, have 
more success with the sympathetic British ambassador. He bluntly told Halifax that he 
wanted a general agreement on the Pacific bases to be signed in the next two or three weeks 
to assist the passage of the loan through Congress. In consequence, Halifax renewed his calls 
that his government accept Byrnes’ proposals to strengthen bilateral relations.62  
Yet the British ambassador’s words fell on deaf ears at the Commonwealth Prime 
Ministers’ Meeting held in late April-early May 1946. Chifley and Evatt took the lead 




Canadian Permanent Board of Joint Defence. Moreover, the spiky Australian added that he 
was pleased Britain now supported regional defence arrangements after appearing to 
previously relegate the Southwest Pacific to a secondary position in its global strategic plans. 
In addition, the deputy prime minister of New Zealand, Walter Nash, present in Fraser’s 
absence, fully agreed with the Australian position. The Commonwealth leaders, therefore, 
agreed to invite the United States to join them in a formal conference to discuss a Pacific 
defence plan. Chifley was thus extremely pleased that Australia’s view had now been 
accepted by the other Commonwealth countries.63 
While the Commonwealth leaders were meeting, however, the Truman administration 
adopted a diametrically opposite policy. On 27 April 1946 the State-War-Navy Coordinating 
Committee (SWNCC) concluded that a regional arrangement for the Southwest Pacific would 
be ‘artificial…premature and inadvisable’ given the lack of an imminent threat in the region 
and might set a dangerous precedent for the Soviet Union to establish rival regional 
arrangements. Accordingly, the SWNCC advocated continued piecemeal discussions based 
on individual bases.64 Unsurprisingly, therefore, when Bevin revealed to Byrnes at a private 
meeting on 2 May 1946 during the Paris Council of Foreign Ministers that the 
Commonwealth desired a conference to discuss Pacific defence the secretary of state insisted 
that the United States ‘had no-one against whom they need prepare to defend themselves’. As 
such, Byrnes stated that all the United States desired in the Southwest Pacific were naval 
repair facilities; the islands for which it had claims; and for Britain to cede Tarawa in the 
Gilbert Islands to the United States. To justify this final request Byrnes argued that the 
American public attached great sentimental value to Tarawa, where one of the US Marines’ 
most important battles had taken place during the war. He added that the island’s transfer 




At this point Bevin greatly complicated matters by completely ignoring the views 
expressed at the Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ Meeting. Acting on his own initiative and 
evidently wanting to present his Commonwealth colleagues with a fait accompli, Bevin 
indicated to Byrnes that his government might be willing to cede Canton, Christmas Island 
and Tarawa; grant the US joint base rights on Funafuti; and even throw the other disputed 
islands ‘into the bag’.66 Bevin was clearly conscious of the United States’ hardening Cold 
War position at this time, triggered by George Kennan’s famous ‘Long Telegram’ sent from 
Moscow on 22 February 1946, and wished to present Britain as Washington’s most useful 
and loyal ally. In fact, Bevin’s principal objective from this time onwards was to entice the 
Truman administration to commit to protect Western Europe from the Soviet Union and was 
prepared to put this ahead of Commonwealth unity. But on hearing of Bevin’s proposals to 
Byrnes the following day both the British Cabinet and Commonwealth leaders present in 
London rejected them, arguing it was a British principle not to cede territory without 
ascertaining the views of the local population. Serious doubts were also expressed that a 
sudden announcement to cede Tarawa would favourably influence the loan debate. Bevin was 
thus instructed to withdraw his proposals but reiterate the Commonwealth’s willingness to 
discuss these issues alongside broader on Pacific defence.67 
Yet Bevin, used to getting his way on foreign policy, sought to convince Attlee to at 
least cede Tarawa on the grounds that transferring ‘this single atoll…[that] meant little to us 
but much to the Americans’ would have a considerable positive ‘psychological effect’ on the 
Truman administration . In addition, Bevin warned that he would have to give some ‘excuse’ 
to Byrnes for rejecting this proposal since if he gave the real reasons ‘it will make things 
worse’.68 Halifax also supported these arguments claiming that Truman had expressed his 
pleasure with the progress made by Byrnes and Bevin and arguing that ceding Tarawa would 




remained adamant.70 Still, on 6 May 1946 the prime minister of South Africa, Jan Smuts, 
rhetorically asked his Commonwealth colleagues: ‘Should we not throw out a bait to catch 
the fish?’ Smuts argued that if the United States was granted base rights ‘today’ they would 
accept greater obligations across the globe ‘tomorrow’. But Evatt questioned why 
Washington wanted bases in the Southwest Pacific if it had no security interests in the region 
as Byrnes claimed. He also insisted that the Commonwealth continue to act in unison and not 
grant base rights unless the United States accepted reciprocal obligations. Attlee did, 
however, convince Evatt and Nash to follow up on the bases issue directly with Byrnes in 
Washington on their journeys home.71   
On 10 May 1946, therefore, Bevin reluctantly informed Byrnes of the 
Commonwealth’s decision and two days later the British Cabinet concluded that ‘the question 
should be allowed to rest for the present’.72 Moreover, while the US ambassador in London, 
Averell Harriman, suggested that he continue to press the Attlee government to issue a 
‘general statement’ on bases to influence the loan debate in Congress, Byrnes felt nothing 
more could be done and it was up to Britain to make the next move.73 On 5 June 1946 the 
joint chiefs of staff also reduced its aspirations for bases in the Southwest Pacific to ‘required 
if reasonably attainable, but not absolutely essential to the base system’. Even so, Washington 
did still desire sovereignty over Canton, Funafuti and Christmas Island.74 
In stark contrast, Evatt was unwilling to accept the defeat of his regional defence plan 
and was determined to personally outline his proposals for the Truman administration.75 
Consequently, between late May and late July 1946 Evatt held a number of meetings in 
Washington with top American officials informing Chifley that ‘the door to negotiations has 
not been closed and that despite all difficulties, satisfactory arrangements may result’. He 
also maintained that ‘Byrnes’ attitude was sympathetic, but non-committal’ despite insisting 




told Evatt a defence treaty would be difficult since it would extend American obligations ‘to 
an area far outside their present hemispherical sphere of influence’. Evatt, ever the 
opportunist, however, immediately suggested that an informal statement clarifying that the 
United States would defend Australia and New Zealand in a future war would suffice.77 
While Truman gave no indication that he supported such a statement, Evatt doggedly 
pursued this plan with the US chief of staff for the Navy, Admiral Chester Nimitz. Evatt 
suggested that if the United States was granted joint use of Manus, Australia should be 
compensated with access to the US base at Guam. Evatt argued that this alternative plan 
‘could properly be regarded as a practical regional arrangement’ that could lead to greater 
defence obligations at a later date. He thus informed Chifley that Nimitz ‘seemed receptive 
to, and even attracted by, this alternative approach’ and agreed such an arrangement was 
‘business-like and at the same time justifiable’ since it implied ‘effective continuation of 
wartime cooperation’. As a result, Evatt felt that Nimitz would recommend the reciprocal use 
of base facilities if in the initial stages the bases involved not too numerous. He was, 
accordingly, ‘hopeful, though not overconfident’ of achieving his objective.78 At the same 
time, Chifley was greatly encouraged by Evatt’s reports, hoping an informal arrangement 
would deflect public concerns that the United States might withdraw from the Southwest 
Pacific altogether. What is more, the Australian Cabinet supported Evatt’s informal statement 
proposal although its ultimate goal remained a regional defence arrangement.79 Nonetheless, 
once Evatt left Washington negotiations came to an abrupt halt. Evidently, Evatt’s reports 
had been exaggerated and the Truman administration had only sought to mollify him.  
Wellington’s position also hardened at this time. On 11 July 1946 Nash informed the 
US undersecretary of state, Dean Acheson, that his government opposed the transfer of any of 
the disputed Commonwealth islands to the United States. Nash also insisted that the US 




regional defence arrangement.80 Additionally, the New Zealand government stated it was 
‘unnecessary and most undesirable’ to declare Western Samoa a ‘strategic area’ in the 
Trusteeship Agreement it would submit to the UN or to grant base rights to the United States 
before this agreement had been concluded.81 
In consequence, by the late summer of 1946 the bases issue appeared to be 
deadlocked. On 8 November 1946, however, the tenacious Evatt told the Australian House of 
Representatives that he ‘had every reason to suppose that a satisfactory arrangement would 
be come to’.82 Evatt then informed the US ambassador at Canberra, Robert Butler, that he 
desired arrangements for the joint use of the Manus base but ‘to satisfy his Parliament, 
Australia must have arrangements for at least token right for mutual use of facilities in at least 
one American base’ on Guam, Canton or American Samoa.83 Evatt also reiterated to Butler 
that Australia ‘should be in on the ground floor’ with the United States on all Pacific 
matters.84 This last-ditched effort to establish some sort of reciprocal arrangement, though, 
was soon rejected. On 12 December 1946 Butler revealed that an agreement had to be 
reached over Manus before Washington would even consider Australian use of its bases.85 
By the end of 1946 an agreement on the Southwest Pacific bases thus appeared more 
distant than ever. But Byrnes’ resignation on 10 January 1947 led to renewed hope that a 
solution could be found. Bevin anticipated the appointment of Second World War hero 
General George Marshall as secretary of state would lead to ‘very wide repercussions’ 
regarding US defence policy, especially in the Pacific.86 The new British ambassador at 
Washington, Lord Inverchapel, was in agreement and urged the Foreign Office to make 
concessions on the disputed islands to convince Marshall to agree to a favourable solution to 
the bases issue.87 Still, Evatt was first to act, returning to his proposal for the reciprocal use of 
bases on Manus and Guam. Rather than encouraging this proposal, though, the new US 




Navy was now planning to completely withdraw from Manus and that an agreement was 
needed to ensure the upkeep of the base.88 Yet, in spite of this clear message, the Australian 
government continued to press for the reciprocal use of bases and Evatt proposed that he visit 
the United States, as well as Nimitz be invited to Canberra, to try to make progress.89  
As a result, on 21 March 1947 Evatt’s proposals were again raised with the State 
Department. Yet on 2 April 1946 the Australian Embassy was informed that the US 
withdrawal from Manus could not be halted since Congress had significantly cut military 
appropriations following a major review of peacetime spending.90 Furthermore, in early June 
1947 the commander-in-chief of the US Navy in the Pacific, Admiral Louis Denfeld, visited 
Australia. Denfield only briefly discussed military matters during his stay but left a note 
stating unequivocally that ‘the Japanese military menace which caused the construction of the 
facilities of Manus has now been removed’. The note added that the US military thought it 
preferable to withdraw completely from Manus and ‘for no agreement according post-war 
military rights to the United States at Manus to be concluded’. The note went on to state 
Manus was only ‘of slight strategic interest’ to the United States in view of the base facilities 
now available in the former Japanese mandated islands captured during the war.91 Evatt was 
greatly disappointment by Washington’s decision and expressed his view to Addison that, 
while Australia had ‘steadfastly declined yielding to the United States on Manus except as 
part of a plan of regional defence or in return for reciprocal rights’, Washington was ‘even 
now endeavouring to play off our interests one against another’.92 
In the meantime, British hopes of rekindling negotiations after Marshall’s 
appointment initially appeared well founded. The SWNCC continued to seek the transfer of 
sovereignty of Canton, Funafuti and Christmas Island although it was willing to accept long-
term joint base rights on these islands.93 In early April 1947 the State Department thus 




of Canton and Enderbury and cede Christmas Island. In return, the United States would drop 
all its other requests for base rights in British territories in the Pacific since the War and Navy 
departments’ demands had fallen alongside their budget cuts.94  
Significantly, while continuing to oppose any transfer of territory, the Attlee 
government wanted to utilise this proposal as an opening. By June 1947 London had thus 
produced a counterproposal offering the United States a ninety-nine year lease for the base on 
Christmas Island; prolonging the existing fifty year condominium of Canton and Enderbury 
to ninety-nine years; and providing the US Marines with two acres of land on Tarawa to 
establish a memorial and cemetery. In return, the British proposed that Commonwealth 
countries retain the right to use bases on these islands, including in wartime even if the 
United States remained neutral, and be accorded the right to use facilities in American Samoa 
and air staging facilities in the Philippines. In addition, Washington would have to abandon 
its claim to Funafuti and publicly state that the security of the Southwest Pacific was a matter 
of concern. The Attlee government, accordingly, hoped such arrangements would ‘open the 
way to discussions at a convenient moment on regional defence’.95  
Nevertheless, London desired Commonwealth support for its counterproposal before 
transmitting it to the United States. On 7 August 1947 Fraser promptly revealed that he 
supported the British approach as a means to reopening negotiations despite doubting the 
Truman administration’s willingness to compromise.96 The Chifley government, however, 
remained non-committal and Evatt, clearly upset by the failure of his own initiative, 
repeatedly postponed holding Commonwealth discussions on the matter. Only on 19 
November 1947, after five months of delay, did Canberra finally agree to support London’s 
proposals on the grounds that it was in Australia’s interest to retain some US role in the 




Yet the window of opportunity, if one had ever existed, had already been closed. On 9 
September 1947 the joint chiefs of staff had concluded that base rights on the Commonwealth 
islands in the Southwest Pacific were no longer desirable.98 The State Department thus paid 
short shrift to the British counterproposal, insisting that the Attlee government recognise US 
sovereignty over the Canton and Enderbury condominium and Christmas Island and in return 
the United States would drop its claims to the other ‘immaterial’ disputed islands. The 
Australian government, however, insisted that all of Washington’s claims were ‘frivolous’ 
and adamantly opposed surrendering control over any Pacific islands ‘as bargaining points’.99  
In December 1947, therefore, the controversial negotiations regarding base rights in 
the Southwest Pacific concluded without the creation of Bevin’s ‘joint controlling system’ for 
that area. This episode demonstrated that while the Commonwealth countries saw their 
security in the Southwest Pacific intimately tied to each other and to the United States, 
Washington shared neither the same strategic interest in the region nor the desire for close 
military relations with the Commonwealth. The Truman administration also clearly did not 
understand how intimate Commonwealth bonds remained after the Second World War. As 
Orders argues, it is easy to see the Commonwealth perspective on the Southwest Pacific 
bases ‘as an imperial hangover’ and as a ‘failure to adapt to new economic, political and 
military realities’.100 Yet these negotiations also revealed the very real frustrations felt by the 
Commonwealth governments at being treated by Washington as junior partners in a region 
formerly seen as their own.  
 
3. Ascension Island and India 
 
Nevertheless, the Southwest Pacific was not the only region where the United States desired 




of desirable bases to Bevin on 6 November 1945 he also included the airbase at Wideawake 
Field on Ascension Island in the South Atlantic and a number of airfields in India. These 
bases were seen as an integral part of the United States’ post-war global security network and 
were discussed alongside the Southwest Pacific bases. Yet the negotiations over these 
airfields involved their own specific problems and generated additional tensions. Also, 
despite both Ascension and India being British colonies, rather than Commonwealth 
territories, London viewed Washington’s request for rights at these bases in the context of the 
broader issue of Commonwealth defence. 
Wideawake Field had been constructed by the United States during the Second World 
War at a cost of approximately $7.25 million and the joint right to use this base was 
categorised by the joint chiefs of staff as ‘essential’.101 The Truman administration, however, 
did not return to this question until 19 March 1946 during the Anglo-American-New Zealand 
exploratory talks in Washington. During these negotiations the State Department produced a 
memorandum outlining its desires for Wideawake Field, stressing that the US military 
viewed this base as a key staging point for air travel across the South Atlantic. The Foreign 
Office, though, had clearly given little thought to this issue since November 1945 and was 
thrown when it was raised in conjunction with what it considered the more pressing issue of 
the Southwest Pacific bases. The British delegation was thus instructed to state it had no 
authorisation to discuss Ascension. Yet the US delegation insisted and their British 
counterparts grudgingly accepted incorporating this question into the discussions.102 
All the same, the Attlee government viewed Ascension not as an exclusively Anglo-
American issue but as one relating to the defence of southern Africa. Just as Australia and 
New Zealand were seen as having special responsibility for Commonwealth security in the 
Southwest Pacific, South Africa was deemed to have principle interest in the southern 




much like Canberra in the Southwest Pacific, Pretoria had long sought greater influence in 
what it considered South Africa’s backyard. While Britain distrusted South Africa’s 
expansionist aspirations, it did not want to discourage Pretoria when it suited Commonwealth 
defence interests.104 In consequence, the British delegation in Washington coordinated 
closely with the South African Legation during the discussions on Ascension. On 20 March 
1946 Bevin also raised the matter with Smuts – in London for the Commonwealth Prime 
Ministers’ Meeting – who largely shared the views of Churchill, his close friend, as well as 
the foreign secretary, regarding US-Commonwealth relations. The South African premier, 
therefore, told Bevin that the Commonwealth should be prepared to concede to the United 
States ‘much of a free hand by way of strategic bases’ to convince Washington to ‘loyally 
support us in our vital African interests’.105 
Nonetheless, with tensions mounting over the Southwest Pacific bases in the summer 
of 1946, the Ascension question again drifted into the background. In fact, in June 1946 the 
joint chiefs of staff downgraded Ascension to the category of ‘required if reasonably 
attainable by negotiations, but not absolutely essential to the base system’.106 Then on 14 
November 1946 the US War Department revealed that it now wanted to withdraw American 
military personnel from the island but to maintain the strategically important facilities for use 
in wartime. The War Department thus proposed that it subsidise Pan-American Airways to 
maintain Wideawake Field for civil aviation purposes so that the base could be quickly 
reverted to military use in a future conflict.107 Still, Bevin dragged his feet on Ascension over 
the winter of 1946-7 since he did not want to set any dangerous precedents for the more 
important discussions on the Southwest Pacific. Bevin, conscious of issues regarding 
sovereignty, also wanted the airfield to remain under British military control rather than being 




resources to maintain Wideawake Field, on 11 February 1947 Bevin reluctantly accepted the 
US proposal on the condition Pretoria concurred.108  
On 13 March 1947, though, the War Department informed the British Embassy that 
its budget had been severely cut by Congress and it could no longer subsidise Pan-American 
Airways. The State Department proposed instead that the British firm Cable and Wireless 
maintain the telecommunications facilities on Ascension ‘in case of emergency’.109 Bevin 
was evidently confused by these mixed signals and warned Marshall that Wideawake Field 
might become ‘unusable’.110 Even so, the cash-strapped US military promptly withdrew its 
personnel from Ascension and the facilities fell into disrepair despite the joints chiefs of 
staff’s continued desire for joint rights at Wideawake Field.111 As such, no agreement was 
reached over Ascension. But the same level of tension had not arisen as with the Southwest 
Pacific bases. Clearly, Wideawake Field, while militarily important, was deemed strategically 
vital by neither the United States nor the Commonwealth and the issue was not linked to any 
binding regional defence arrangements. 
Nevertheless, while it had been partially receptive to Washington’s initiative 
regarding Ascension, the Attlee government was unwilling to entertain Byrnes’ proposals for 
joint rights at the Indian airfields at Dudhkundi and Barrackpore, near Kolkata, and Karachi. 
These airfields had been enlarged by the United States during the Second World War at a cost 
of over $1 million and used mainly to transport supplies to the Southeast Asian and Chinese 
theatres. Yet, with the extremely difficult negotiations for Indian independence in full swing, 
Bevin informed Byrnes on 15 November 1945 that his proposals placed Britain in a ‘very 
difficult situation’ since India was now ‘virtually a sovereign state’.112 In addition, the 
secretary of state for India, Lord Pethick-Lawrence, and the viceroy to India, Lord Wavell, 





Washington appeared to appreciate these arguments and did not return to the matter 
until 11 February 1946 when the joint chiefs of staff included the airbases at Kolkata and 
Karachi, as well as at Agra and Yangon, on a list of global bases at which air transit rights 
were deemed desirable.114 On 28 February 1946, therefore, Byrnes emphatically informed 
Halifax by way of a map that Indian airfields, in comparison to the Southwest Pacific bases, 
were ‘within closer reach of where danger might develop’ and ‘plumped the palm of his hand 
down on Siberia’. Byrnes obviously did not want to name the Soviet Union as a potential 
enemy with the Cold War in its infancy. But there was little doubt in Halifax’s mind that the 
Truman administration now attached great importance to securing facilities in India as ‘an 
advanced outpost on the periphery of the Soviet orbit’.115 In April 1946 the India Office, 
however, warned again that no agreement could be reached on this issue until after Indian 
independence. Furthermore, the British Cabinet Mission conducting negotiations in India 
opposed raising the American proposal believing that it would further complicate their 
difficult job. The Cabinet Mission simply recommended that Washington seek to negotiate 
directly with the soon-to-be-established Indian interim government.116  
Even so, Byrnes did not initially appear to grasp that British rule of India was ending 
and continued to press his proposal with Bevin at Paris, stressing that the United States ‘could 
provide the greatest aid in case of trouble in the Indian Ocean by having the necessary 
facilities’. On 6 May 1946, though, Byrnes informed Bevin that the US military was no 
longer interested in the Indian airfields.117 Evidently, Byrnes had understood from Britain’s 
own bitter experience that base rights in India would not be granted at present. Indeed, India 
continued to be considered vital to the Commonwealth’s defence strategy given its proximity 
to the Soviet Union and location at the crossroads between Britain, its Asian colonies, and the 
Pacific Dominions. As such, during the independence negotiations the Attlee government 




and Pakistan, Jawaharlal Nehru and Mohammad Ali Jinnah respectively, to sign a formal 
defence treaty permitting continued use of military facilities on the subcontinent. Yet both 
Nehru and Jinnah were unwilling to enter into defence relations with Britain believing this 
would derogate independence even before it had been won. With India rapidly descending 
into sectarian violence, therefore, the Attlee government accelerated its withdrawal plans, 
postponing attempts to negotiate a defence treaty.118 Accordingly, the Indian airfields issue 
was dropped in early 1946 before it generated serious Anglo-American tensions. Even so, on 
9 September 1947, less than a month after Partition, the joint chiefs of staff renewed their 
desires for transit rights at the airbases in independent India and Pakistan.119 
 
4. Reciprocal Use of Naval Ports 
 
Despite the many problems encountered between the Commonwealth countries and the 
United States over base rights, one notable success was achieved. On 23 August 1946, with 
the negotiations at a nadir, Byrnes proposed to Bevin the reciprocal use of all US and 
Commonwealth naval ports and air facilities for refuelling, loading supplies, minor repairs 
and recreational purposes. He argued that this was necessary with the reversion to peacetime 
arrangements imminent since this would entail needing to attain through diplomatic channels 
permission to use each other’s facilities on every occasion. While Byrnes made this proposal 
‘in a seemingly casual way’, Bevin immediately understood that this was a serious attempt to 
break the deadlock and informed Attlee that such arrangements were ‘of great advantage’. 
Bevin also connected this proposal to Washington’s growing acceptance of ‘the possibility of 
another war in the present generation’. In addition, Attlee and the chiefs of staff agreed that 
the proposal had ‘every advantage and no substantial disadvantage’ as long as all 




Yet the negotiations got off to a rocky start in September 1946. To Bevin’s 
disappointment, the State Department limited its ‘embryo plan’ to reciprocal use of naval 
ports at Gibraltar, Malta, Guam and Pearl Harbor. Bevin thus informed Byrnes that to be 
effective the agreement needed to be global and include air facilities given the ever-
increasing strategic importance of air power. But Byrnes explained that emphasis was placed 
on the Mediterranean and the North Pacific due to the difficulties presented by Australia’s 
plans for a Southwest Pacific security arrangement.121 Realising Byrnes would not go any 
further, Bevin dropped his demands and proposed that Britain and the United States 
undertake an informal understanding allowing each country’s navy to use the other’s ports as 
a guest rather than through a written agreement ‘liable to misinterpretation’ by Moscow.122  
Bevin’s proposal was promptly accepted by the State Department and on 24 October 
1946 an Anglo-American naval understanding was established. Washington, however, 
continued to resist British calls to extend the reciprocal arrangements to air facilities, arguing 
that this would ‘arouse international interest’ and ad hoc practices already existed between 
the United States and Commonwealth countries. Still, the Foreign Office was pleased 
progress had been made believing it ‘desirable to get what we can by stages rather than to 
hold out for too much all at once’.123 The chiefs of staff, though, continued to press for an 
understanding regarding the use of air facilities for staging purposes, stating that this would 
not involve the stationing of military personnel on foreign territory or create controversy. The 
Truman administration, nevertheless, refused to budge and in early December 1946 London 
dropped the matter for fear of risking what had already been agreed.124 
Significantly, the British government had not, as was normally the case, kept the 
Commonwealth capitals fully informed of these discussions since Washington had explicitly 
wished to pursue separate negotiations with each country. The Dominions Office, therefore, 




Attlee decided it would be unfortunate if the Dominions got the impression something had 
been settled without them.125 The British government was thus relieved to find out very 
similar understandings were being reached in concurrent discussions between the US and 
Canadian, Australian and New Zealand navies.126 The United States did not, however, seek 
an understanding with South Africa given the limited contact between the two countries’ 
navies. Instead, Britain agreed that the US Navy could utilise its naval base at Simonstown 
outside Cape Town with Pretoria being kept informed.127 Evidently, the Commonwealth 
countries, while acting alone in this instance, were united in recognising the practical benefits 
of the reciprocal use of naval ports with the United States. Moreover, while the agreements 




Between 1945 and 1947 rights to use military bases appeared to offer an opportunity to 
strengthen the US-Commonwealth ‘special relationship’ forged during the Second World 
War. Washington wanted long-term global base rights while Commonwealth countries had 
such facilities in their territories. Yet this article has demonstrated that base rights proved one 
of the most contentious issues experienced between Washington and the Commonwealth 
capitals in the immediate post-war period. The Truman administration expected its junior 
partners to willingly grant base rights without having to make concessions of their own. In 
particular, Washington resisted every effort by the Commonwealth to involve it in reciprocal 
defence arrangements. At the same time, the US government showed little understanding of 
the importance the Commonwealth continued to hold for its members, seeking repeatedly to 
drive wedges between them to achieve its ends. In stark contrast, despite the vastly changed 




with the United States while also retaining traditionally exclusive ties with each other. What 
is more, Washington’s strategic priorities did not duplicate those of the Commonwealth. 
While the Southwest Pacific, South Asia and southern Africa were seen as important to US 
military planners, the Commonwealth deemed these areas vital to their security. 
Consequently, American desires for bases in these regions were curtailed when negotiations 
stalled and Congress imposed military budget cuts. 
 This article has added, therefore, significant new insights into the embryonic stages of 
the US-Commonwealth ‘special relationship’. With memories of the Second World War fresh 
and the emergence of the Cold War, the Commonwealth capitals were determined to utilize 
their strengths – namely bases in the Southwest Pacific, India and on Ascension Island – as a 
bargaining chip to establish binding military ties, or what Bevin termed a ‘joint controlling 
system’, with the United States. Furthermore, Commonwealth cohesion proved surprisingly 
resilient under pressure from the Truman administration, with each government refusing to 
deviate from their shared goal. For its part, though, the United States’ unwillingness to 
compromise further confirms that its relationship with the Commonwealth was only ‘special’ 
as long as it was on Washington’s terms. Agreements could thus only be reached when 
American and Commonwealth interests aligned over limited mutually beneficial issues such 
as the reciprocal use of naval facilities. 
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